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• Why is a delegation of powers from the Council to
the Commission possible?
• Are there any limits for such a delegation of powers?
• What justification is there for the comitology
committee structure?
• Should the European Parliament have more rights in
controlling the Commission in its law-making?
1. The principle of separation of powers
A basic feature of the constitutions of the Member States
and the U.S. is the principle of separation of powers:
The American constitution of 1787 is the textbook
example in that respect: Its first three articles designate
the organs in which the legislative, the executive and the
judicial power are ‘vested’ (the Congress, the President,
the Supreme Court and such lower Courts as Congress
may from time to time establish).
But also the French, German and British
Constitutions are based on that principle:
The 1789 French Déclaration des droits de l’homme
et du citoyen, to which the present 1958 Fifth Constitution
commits itself in its Preamble, even proclaimed that ‘a
society where the separation is not established is no
society at all’.
The 1949 German Grundgesetz establishes, in Art.
20 (2), that ‘all state authority shall be exercised by the
people through elections and voting and by specific
organs of the legislature, the executive power, and the
judiciary’. The principle of separation of powers is a
basic constitutional principle which according to Article
79 (3) of the Grundgesetz cannot be amended.
In the unwritten British Constitution the principle
also exists, but refers mainly to the independence of the
judiciary, as executive and legislative powers are closely
intermingled.7
In contrast to the abovementioned, in the EC the
existence of a principle of separation of powers in this
form has been expressly rejected by the European Court
of Justice:8 The UK argued in an annulment procedure
that a Commission directive was void because it was
‘clear from the Treaty provisions governing the
institutions that all original law-making power is vested
in the Council, whilst the Commission has only powers
of surveillance and implementation’. According to the
Court of Justice there is, however, ‘no basis for that
argument in the Treaty provisions governing the
institutions’. Article 4 of the Treaty provides, however,
that ‘each institution shall act within the limits of the
powers conferred on it by this Treaty’. Referring to
Articles 4, 145, 155 and 189 of the Treaty, the Court
ruled that ‘the limits of the powers conferred’ on an
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The Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam failed
– amongst other institutional questions – to address the
issue of comitology.2 The purpose of this article is to
carry out a comparative analysis of executive law-
making in other legal systems with the aim of arriving at
a conclusion as to whether or not this must be regarded
as a major shortcoming.
In 1996 the European Commission adopted – in
addition to numerous decisions – 2,341 regulations and
2,806 directives, being legal acts with general application,
whereas the Council adopted 484 legal acts in total.3 In
terms of mere quantity, the Commission is thus the
Community’s main law-maker. In many of these cases
the Commission’s legal acts were adopted after the
Council had conferred implementation powers on the
Commission and a so-called comitology committee,
composed of representatives of the Member States, had
given its opinion on a Commission proposal.
Executive law-making at EC level with the
participation of national government officials has
repeatedly been criticised as undemocratic.4 It indeed
raises fundamental questions with respect to the principle
of separation of powers and the possibility of delegating
powers. It seems, however, appropriate to consider
these questions not only with regard to the EC, but also
from a comparative point of view with respect to the
legal systems in the Member States and the U.S.: Law-
making by the executive exists not only in the EC, but
also in the Member States themselves – and in the
United States of America: parliaments adopt primary
legislation in the form of an ‘Act’ (U.S., UK), a ‘loi’
(France) or a ‘Gesetz’ (Germany), whereas secondary
legislation is enacted by the governments in the form of
an ‘Order’ or a ‘Regulation’ (U.S., UK), an ‘ordonnance’
(France) or a ‘Rechtsverordnung’ (Germany).5
In certain cases a comparison between national and
EC law involves specific difficulties because the two
levels differ in many respects.6 As far as the separation
and delegation of legislative powers is concerned, the
following observations will, however, show that this is
only (partly) the case with respect to the question of
parliamentary control.
The purpose of this article is thus to examine whether
executive law-making in the EC is fundamentally
different from that in France, Germany, the UK (which
shall be used as examples of Member States) and the
U.S. with regard to the following questions:
• Is there a principle of separation of powers in EC law?
____________________
* Un bref résumé de cet article en français figure à la fin.3
institution ‘are to be inferred not from a general principle,
but from an interpretation of the particular provision in
question’.
The Treaty provisions do, indeed, not distinguish
between legislative, executive and judicial powers. The
Court of Justice has, however, ruled that the legislative
scheme of the Treaty, and in particular the last paragraph
of Article 155, establishes a distinction between the
measures directly based on the Treaty itself and derived
law intended to ensure their implementation.9 It has
been suggested10 that measures directly based on the
Treaty itself should be considered as legislative acts,
whereas derived law should be considered as executive
acts.
Under that presumption, there is a functional
separation of powers inherent in the EC Treaty:
The legislative power (that is the power to enact
measures directly based on the Treaty itself) lies –
depending on the relevant procedure – with the Council,
the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council,
and – in a few cases11 – with the Commission.
The executive power (that is the power to implement
the legislative acts) lies – as far as the Community
executes its legislation itself, and not the Member States
– with the Council which, however, according to Article
145 must confer it to the Commission and may reserve
the right to exercise directly implementing powers itself
only in specific cases.
The judicial power (that is the power to review the
legality of legislative and executive acts under Article
173 and the power to interpret EC law under Article
177) lies with the European Court of Justice.
2. Possibility of a delegation of powers
In the U.S. the question as to whether Congress can
delegate its law-making powers to the Government has
long been disputed since the Constitution is silent in that
respect.
In 1690 John Locke wrote:
‘... the legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated
power from the people, they who have it cannot pass
it over to others’.12
In 1892 the Supreme Court ruled in accordance with
Locke’s principle
‘that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President is a principle universally recognised as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system
of government ordained by the Constitution’.13
It was only in 1928 that the Supreme Court ruled that
a delegation of legislative authority was possible:
‘The rule is that in the actual administration of the
government Congress or the Legislature should
exercise the legislative power, the President or the
State executive, the Governor, the executive power,
and the Courts or the judiciary the judicial power,
and in carrying out that constitutional division into
three branches it is a breach of the National
fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative
power and transfers it to the President ... This is not
to say that the three branches are not coordinate
parts of one government and that each in the field of
its duties may not invoke the action of the two other
branches in so far as the action invoked shall not be
an assumption of the constitutional field of action of
another branch. In determining what it may do in
seeking assistance from another branch, the extent
and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent
necessities of the governmental co-ordination’14
[italics added by the author in all citations].
In a European context such a discussion could not
arise: Article 155 EC Treaty provides that ‘the
Commission shall exercise the powers conferred on it
by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid
down by the latter’. After the amendments made to the
Treaty by the Single European Act in 1987 Article 145
EC Treaty now provides not only for the possibility, but
even for an obligation to transfer powers: ‘... the Council
shall ... confer on the Commission, in the acts which the
Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the
rules which the Council lays down’.
This does, however, of course not mean that the
community legislator is not free to regulate all the
details of the matter to be dealt with: the use of Article
145 EC under which the Council can delegate
implementation powers to the Commission is optional.15
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has
given the concept of implementation a wide
interpretation: It ‘comprises both the drawing up of
implementing rules and the application of rules to specific
cases by means of acts of individual application’.16 As a
consequence, the Council can delegate to the
Commission the power to enact rules of general
application.
This is also the case in the Member States:
The British Parliament17 as well as the German
Bundestag (according to Article 80 of the Grundgesetz)
can delegate to the Government the power to make law.
Similarly, Art. 21 of the French Constitution provides
that the Prime Minister ‘ensures the implementation of
enactments’ which also includes the ‘power to make
regulations’. But French law goes even further: apart
from this subordinate law-making power, there is also
an autonomous law-making power of the executive
which is unique compared to American, British, EC and
German law: Art. 37 of the French Constitution provides
that matters other than those which fall within the
domain of legislation (which is enacted by Parliament
only as regards those matters listed in Art. 34) are
regulatory in character and are therefore dealt with by
government decrees. Apart from this general delegation
of law-making powers to the government by the
Constitution itself there is also the possibility for the4
Parliament to confer legislative powers on the
Government in specific cases: Art. 38 of the Constitution
provides that ‘in order to carry out its programme, the
Government may ask Parliament to authorise it, for a
limited period, to take by means of ordinances measures
which normally fall within the domain of legislation’.
The fact that European, American, British, French
and German constitutional law permits the delegation of
legislative powers to the executive, shows that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s assumption that there is an ‘inherent
necessity’ to delegate law-making powers to the
executive is correct.
3. Limits to a delegation of powers
In the Köster case18 of 1970 the ECJ was asked whether
there were any limits to the delegation of powers from
the Council to the Commission:
Council Regulation 19/6219 which was adopted on
the basis of Art. 43 (2) of the EEC Treaty made all
importation and exportation of cereals subject to the
presentation of an import or export licence. It also
provided that import licences were only to be issued
subject to the lodging of a deposit which would be
forfeited if the importation did not take place within a
certain prescribed period. It was further stipulated that
the detailed rules for the application of these provisions
had to be adopted in accordance with a management
committee procedure. In accordance with this procedure
and in implementing of the Council Regulation, the
Commission adopted Regulation 102/6420 which laid
down that import and export licences could only be
obtained after a deposit had been lodged which would
be forfeited if the import or export was not effected
within the period stipulated in the respective licence.
The German company Köster obtained such an
export licence after having lodged the required deposit
of 2,400 DM. Since the export was not effected within
the period of validity, the deposit was declared forfeited
by the competent German authority. Köster appealed
against this decision to an administrative court; arguing
that only the Council could have adopted the Regulation
102/64 in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Art. 43 (2) of the Treaty, but not the Commission
according to a different procedure. The German court
referred this question to the European Court of Justice
which rejected Köster’s argument, stating that:
‘It is sufficient ... that the basic elements of the
matter to be dealt with have been adopted in
accordance with the procedure laid down (by the
Treaty). On the other hand, the provisions
implementing the basic regulations may be adopted
according to a (different) procedure, either by the
Council itself or by the Commission by virtue of an
authorisation complying with Article 155’.
This follows ‘both from the legislative scheme of the
Treaty, reflected in particular by the last indent of
Article 155’ and ‘the legal concepts recognised in all
the Member States’.
Also in the U.S. and Germany the legislator is not
free to delegate all law-making powers to the executive.
There are, however, two different concepts of setting
limits to the legislator in transferring powers to the
executive: In the EC, the basic principle is that only
implementation powers can be delegated, which means
that what may be conferred and what not must be
delineated by interpretation of the term implementation.
The concepts in the U.S. and in Germany are different:
They seek to ascertain not which powers can be delegated,
but which elements of a matter must be dealt with by the
Parliament.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled as follows:
‘... the most that may be asked under the separation-
of-powers doctrine is that Congress lay down the
general policy and standards that animate the law,
leaving the agency to refine those standards, ‘fill in
the blanks’, or apply the standards to particular
cases’. This principle ‘ensures to the extent consistent
with orderly governmental administration that
important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will’.21
The German approach is very similar: According to
the ‘Wesentlichkeitstheorie’ (theory of ‘essentialness’)
and the doctrine of legislative reservation which were
developed by the German Constitutional Court, essential
questions of a particular matter must be regulated by an
act of Parliament.22
Yet, although the German and American courts ask
which elements must be regulated by the legislator,
whereas the ECJ asks which elements are of an
implementing nature so that the executive can deal with
them, it is striking to observe that the conclusions
reached by all the three courts are practically identical:
Important/essential choices must be made by the
legislator, whereas everything else can be dealt with by
the executive.
The position is different in France and the UK:
Under British law the Parliament is free to decide which
powers should be delegated and Art. 38 of the French
Constitution also sets no limits concerning the delegation
of legislative powers.
It is interesting to observe that in practice the courts
have hardly ever invalidated law made by the executive
on the ground that it regulated an essential element of a
subject:
There is not a single such case in the jurisprudence
of the ECJ.23
In the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court which is
very comprehensive in that respect there are only two
cases (from the mid 1930s) where the Supreme Court
invalidated delegations of legislative powers.24
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has on
several occasions invalidated delegations of law-making
power to the executive.25 This jurisprudence has
provoked mixed reactions: Whereas some think that the
‘Germans have worked hard to maintain’ something5
that the Americans have ‘lost’,26 others argue that it has
become practically impossible to predict opinions of the
Court in a specific case.27
In summing up, it can be recorded that the highest
U.S., EC and – to a lesser extent – German courts have
exercised judicial restraint to a considerable extent when
they have been asked to rule on the limits of delegated
rule-making.
4. Federal aspects
Another important question is whether in federal systems
like Germany, the U.S. or the EC the Länder, states or
Member States have the power to participate in the
executive law-making process:
This is the case in the EC under the comitology
system which was established in the EC in the early
1960s as a matter of necessity, because the Council did
not have the necessary resources to take all the
implementing measures itself, but also wanted to keep
control over the way the Commission implements the
law:28 In certain cases (I and IIa-Committees) the
Commission is relatively free in its implementation,
whereas it must avoid a negative opinion of the competent
Committee in other cases (IIb-Committees) or even
needs the Committee’s approval on a certain proposal
(in IIIa and IIIb-Committees). That this system does not
distort the Community’s institutional structure, because
the committees do not have the power to take decisions
in place of the Commission or the Council, was
acknowledged by the Court of Justice in the Köster
case:29
‘The function of the management Committee is to
ensure permanent consultation in order to guide the
Commission in the exercise of the powers conferred
on it by the Council and to enable the latter to
substitute its own action for that of the Commission.
The Management Committee does therefore not
have the power to take a decision in place of the
Commission or the Council. Consequently, without
distorting the Community structure and the
institutional balance, the Management Committee
machinery enables the Council to delegate to the
Commission an implementing power of appreciable
scope, subject to its power to take the decision itself
if necessary’.
In 1987, with the amendment of Article 145 EC
Treaty and the adoption of the comitology decision,30
the established practice was put on a firm legal basis.31
There are striking similarities to the German system:
According to Article 80 (2) of the Grundgesetz practically
all government regulations need the consent of the
Bundesrat32 (the second chamber of the German
Parliament in which the Länder are represented with
varying numbers of votes according to their size).33 The
only difference with the comitology system is that in
Germany the ‘parent’ institution itself is asked for its
consent, whereas the Council does not itself give its
opinion on a proposal from the Commission: It has
instead set up committees, which are however, like the
Council, composed of representatives of the Member
States who speak in their interests and whose votes have
the same weight as those of the Ministers in the Council.
In the U.S., on the other hand, there is no similar
system of participation for the States: here no institution
or committee structure has been established to represent
the opinions of the State Governments.
5. Parliamentary control – ‘Modus vivendi’ – Treaty
of Amsterdam
Finally we shall consider the question as to which
degree of parliamentary control there is over the way the
executive exercises its implementing powers:
In the U.S. until 1983 it was possible for Congress to
delegate law-making powers to the executive (and in
particular government agencies) under certain
conditions: legislative proposals from the agencies had
to be transmitted to Congress and took effect only if
neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
rejected them during the two following sessions. This
practice which had been used 295 times in 196 different
statutes since 1932 was challenged and found to be
invalid by the Supreme Court34 because it violated the
principle of separation of powers:
The question was whether a veto of the House of
Representatives against a decision of the Department of
Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service to
suspend the deportation of a Mr. Chadha violated the
principle of the separation of powers. The right of veto
for both the House and the Senate was part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The Supreme Court
found it to be unconstitutional:
‘The constitution sought to divide the delegated
powers of the new federal government into three
defined categories, legislative, executive and judicial,
to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of
government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. ... Although not ‘hermetically’ sealed
from one another, the powers delegated to the three
Branches are functionally identifiable. ... Congress
made a deliberate choice to delegate to the executive
Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the
authority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this
country in certain specified circumstances. ... This
choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of
decision that can be implemented only in accordance
with the procedures set out in Article I (of the
Constitution). Disagreement with the Attorney
General’s decision on Chadha’s deportation ... no
less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to the
Attorney General the authority to make that decision,
involves decisions that Congress can implement in
only one way: bicameral passage followed by
presentment to the President. Congress must abide
by its delegation of authority until that delegation is
legislatively altered or revoked’.6
Justice White dissented with the opinion of the
Court on the following grounds:
‘The history of the legislative veto makes clear that
it has not been a sword with which Congress has
struck out to aggrandise itself at the expense of the
other branches. Rather, the veto has been a means of
defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary
if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under
Article I as the nation’s lawmaker. While the President
has often objected to particular legislative vetoes,
generally those left in the hands of congressional
committees, the Executive has more often agreed to
legislative review as the price for broad delegation
of authority. To be sure, the President may have
preferred unrestricted power, but that could be
precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain
a check on the exercise of delegated authority’.
The German Bundestag has in certain cases also
made the adoption of government regulations dependent
upon prior consultation, non-objection or even consent
of the Bundestag:35 This practice was challenged before
the  Bundesverfassungsgericht which had concerns
similar to those of the U.S. Supreme Court. The German
court tried, however, to find a middle path between the
two opposite positions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
majority and Justice White: It found a conditional
delegation of powers to be compatible with the principle
of separation of powers at least in certain fields:
‘Authorizations for the adoption of regulations which
are made dependent on the consent of the Bundestag
do not contribute to a clear separation of the
responsibilities of the executive and the legislature.
From the fact that Art. 80 (1) Grundgesetz does not
expressly allow them, does, however, not follow
that they are unlawful. Nor does this follow from the
principle of separation of powers: also as far as
legislation is concerned, the competences of the
legislature and the executive are interlinked in many
ways. Although the Grundgesetz reserves legislation
in principle to the legislature, there is an exception to
this principle in that there is the possibility of
authorizing the executive to legislate (Art. 80
Grundgesetz). Such authorizations can be seen as a
minus in comparison to a full delegation of legislation
to the executive. They are compatible with the
Grundgesetz  at least in such areas where it must be
acknowledged that the legislature has a legitimate
interest in delegating the law-making to the executive
on the one hand, but on the other hand, because of
the importance of the regulations to be made, to
retain decisive influence over the adoption and the
content of the regulations’.36
The British Parliament has very strong powers to
control executive law-making (which, because of the
supremacy of Parliament, cannot be challenged in a
court): There are two forms of parliamentary review of
delegated legislation:37 Under the affirmative procedure,
draft delegated legislation will not take effect until there
has been an express approval by Parliament. Under the
negative procedure, delegated legislation will take effect
unless within forty days of it having been put before
Parliament it has been expressly rejected by Parliament.
In the French system, which is unique in granting
original law-making powers to the government, there is
no parliamentary control of executive law-making.
In the EC the Parliament’s rights in controlling the
Commission in the implementation of EC law are very
limited, but not for the same reasons as in the U.S.:
The European Parliament followed the development
of the comitology system with mistrust from the very
beginning, since measures of considerable importance
were adopted without any parliamentary participation.
For many years it used the political, budgetary and
jurisdictional means at its disposal to counteract the
spread of comitology.38 After failed attempts to increase
its rights by freezing parts of the budget for the
committees, it was, however, only in 1993 that the
Parliament also acquired legal arguments in favour of a
change: with the introduction of the co-decision
procedure (Art. 189b EC), the Parliament became a co-
legislator in certain fields. The implication for the
Parliament was clear: not only the law-making, but also
the delegation of implementing powers was now a joint
competence of the Council and the Parliament: Art. 145
EC was not applicable to acts passed under Art. 189b
since it referred only to acts passed by the Council, but
not by the Council and the European Parliament jointly.
Not only should the Parliament have an equal say on
which competences should be delegated and which
form of delegation should be chosen; the Parliament
should also have the same rights as the Council in
controlling the Commission in exercising the delegated
implementing powers.39
The Council, however, did not agree with this
interpretation of the changes made by the Maastricht
Treaty. Commission, Council and Parliament found a
provisional agreement, the so-called modus vivendi:40 It
provides that the Commission shall send any draft
general implementing act not only to the comitology
committee, but also to the appropriate committee of the
European Parliament, the comments of which the
Commission shall take account of as far as possible;41
furthermore the Council shall adopt a draft general
implementing act which has been referred to it in
accordance with an implementing procedure only after
informing the European Parliament, setting a reasonable
time limit for obtaining its opinion, and, in the event of
an unfavourable opinion, taking due account of the
European Parliament’s point of view without delay, in
order to seek a solution in the appropriate framework.42
A definitive solution was left to the 1996 IGC.43 The
draft Treaty of Amsterdam leaves this question, however,
unsolved: A declaration to the Final Act44 ‘calls on the
Commission to submit to the Council by the end of 1998
at the latest a proposal to amend’ the comitology decision.
This may be seen as an indication that major changes7
will not occur.
There would, however, be no legal limits to an
increase in the rights of the European Parliament
comparable to those in the U.S. (or to a lesser extent in
Germany): Article 4 EC Treaty does not set any limits to
Treaty amendments which shift the power balance
between the institutions. Therefore the European
Parliament could be placed on an equal footing with the
Council in comitology by an amendment of Article 145
EC, maybe even by an amendment of the comitology
decision.
One may finally wonder why in national legal systems
there is nothing comparable to this power struggle
between the EC institutions. The answer is simple, but
reveals a fundamental difference of the Parliament’s
role in national and European law. Whereas in national
systems the Parliament is the legislator and thus free to
decide whether or not to delegate powers to the executive,
the European Parliament has only been a co-legislator
together with the Council since 1993, and only in certain
cases. If, on the other hand, the Council alone decides to
delegate powers to the Commission in cases where the
Parliament is not a co-legislator, it deprives the Parliament
of its right to be consulted without there being any
chance for the Parliament to prevent that.
Conclusion
A comparison of the comitology system in the EC with
the delegation of powers in France, Germany, the UK
and the U.S. shows the following:
Even though the EC legal system does not contain a
clear-cut principle of separation of powers, there is a
functional separation of powers, under which as a rule
it is the Council and the European Parliament which
adopt legislative measures directly based on the Treaty,
whereas the Commission has executive or implemention
powers.
As in the U.S. and the Member States the EC legislator
(Council) can delegate law-making powers to the
executive (Commission) under Article 145 EC Treaty.
T he American, EC and German systems have (very
similar) limits for a delegation of powers. In France and
the UK there are no such limits.
In Germany the Länder can participate in delegated
law-making in the Bundesrat in a very similar way to the
Member States in the comitology system. In the U.S.
there is no similar structure.
In the UK and in Germany the Parliaments have
certain rights in controlling the executive in its
implementation. In the EC these rights are still very
limited. There are no such rights in France and the U.S.
(where this is even considered as unconstitutional).
The comitology system therefore has striking
similarities with the other systems with which we have
compared it without being identical to any of them.
Within the last 40 years or so it has become a system of
executive law-making of its own which is, however,
built on existing legal and political principles: Like in
other legal systems, it soon became evident that executive
law-making is a question of necessity since the legislator
often lacks resources and expertise to regulate all details
of a subject matter himself. The Court of Justice has
recognised that necessity but has set limits to executive
law-making for reasons of democratic accountability.
The committee structure meets the need of acceptability
of community rules to the Member States. The fact that
the EP has only very limited rights to participate in the
executive law-making process can be interpreted in two
different ways: With regard to France and the U.S., there
is no need for a change: Once law-making powers have
been delegated to the executive, there is no more necessity
for the executive to ask for parliamentary consent; on
the contrary, this can even be regarded as a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. With a view to
Germany and the UK, the European Parliament’s very
limited rights can be seen as a lack of democratic control
and be explained by the fact that the European Parliament
is not yet a full legislative body in its own right.
In summing up, the comitology structure reflects in
particular three features:
First, that the EC is – like the Member States and the
U.S. – a Community based on law and the principle of
separated powers with limited competences, which
includes, however, a (limited) possibility of delegating
legislative powers to the executive.
Secondly, it represents a mixture of the executive
law-making systems of the larger Member States (as far
as parliamentary rights of control are concerned).
Finally, it reflects the fact that despite (or because of)
the development of the EC into a system which has
many federal features, the interests of the Member
States are taken into account not only in the process of
making secondary, but also tertiary law (as far as the
existence of the committee structure is concerned).
The comitology system did not develop by mere
coincidence, but there are good reasons for each one of
its features. The comparison with the British, French,
German and U.S. system of delegating powers shows
that it is certainly no more undemocratic than those.45
Since none of its three key features is very likely to
change fundamentally (and it is very questionable
whether that would be desirable in every case), it can be
expected that the comitology system will remain an
important part of EC law-making for many years to
come.
RÉSUMÉ
La comitologie après Amsterdam
La Conférence intergouvernementale d’Amsterdam n’a
pas réussi à traiter de la question de la comitologie, ni
d’ailleurs d’un certain nombre d’autres questions
institutionnelles. Le but de cet article est d’effectuer une
analyse comparative du processus d’élaboration des
lois par l’exécutif dans d’autres systèmes juridiques
afin d’arriver à une conclusion sur la question de savoir
s’il faut y voir une déficience majeure. En 1996, la
Commission européenne a adopté – à côté de
nombreuses décisions – 2.341 règlements et 2.0868
directives, c’est-à-dire des actes d’application générale,
alors que le Conseil a adopté 484 actes au total. En
termes purement quantitatifs, la Commission est donc le
principal législateur dans la Communauté. Dans bon
nombre de cas, les actes de la Commission sont adoptés
après que le Conseil ait conféré des pouvoirs d’exécution
à la Commission et après qu’un comité, composé de
représentants des Etats membres, ait donné son avis ou
son feu vert sur une proposition de la Commission selon
un ensemble de règles que l’on regroupe sous le vocable
de la “comitologie”. Ce processus d’élaboration des
lois par l’exécutif au niveau de la CE, auquel participent
des fonctionnaires des gouvernements nationaux, a été
critiqué à plusieurs reprises comme n’étant pas
démocratique. En effet, il soulève des questions
fondamentales par rapport au principe de séparation
des pouvoirs et à la possibilité de déléguer des pouvoirs.
Ce processus d’élaboration des lois par l’exécutif
existe non seulement dans la CE, mais aussi dans les
Etats membres – et aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique. Les
parlements adoptent la législation primaire sous forme
d’un “Act” (US, UK), de loi (France) ou de “Gesetz”
(en Allemagne), alors que la législation dérivée est
adoptée par les gouvernements sous forme d’un “order”
ou “regulation” (US, UK), d’ordonnance (France) ou
de Rechstverordnung (Allemagne). Dès lors, il convient
tout particulièrement de se pencher sur ces questions
non seulement par rapport à la CE, mais aussi sous un
angle comparatif en ce qui concerne les systèmes
juridiques dans les Etats membres et aux Etats-Unis.
Cet article montre qu’en la matière, le processus
communautaire ne diffère fondamentalement pas du
système que l’on rencontre en France, en Allemagne, au
Royaume-Uni (qui seront utilisés comme exemples pour
les Etats membres) et aux Etats-Unis.
____________________
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